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Abstract
Firms sign an integration contract with the purpose of increasing their expected prots from
trade and competition with third parties. Gains depend on how the contract improves the partners
production function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), and how it increases their power in
the marketplace.
We investigate three bilateral integration contracts under di¤erent ownership allocations over
resources: M&A, Minority Stake purchase and Joint Venture. We study them theoretically with a
cooperative game approach. We derive some protability conditions that we test empirically on a
sample of about 9000 US rms. In order to estimate the link between ownership, asset complemen-
tarity and prots over time, we propose a novel multiproduct and time-varying complementarity
index. Empirical results fully support our theoretical predictions.
JEL classication: C22; C71; G34
Keywords: Cooperative Games; Merger; Acquisition; Joint venture; Complementarity
1. Introduction
An integration contract among a group of rms, not only may improve the joint pro-
duction function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), it may also increase joint power
towards competitors and trading parties. Prots can either increase or decrease after in-
tegration. In this paper, we analyze how partnersjoint prots from the contract depend
on the type of assets they integrate and, specically, on the complementarity of integrated
assets with third partiesassets.
Suppose that at time 0 a subset of players sign an integration contract. They choose
which part of their assets to integrate. At time 1 all players bargain over the division of the
payo¤s from production or trade. The contract signed at time 0 changes the control over
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resources, and then a¤ects bargaining at time 1. For instance, an M&A will give the acquiror
the full control over the targets resources. If thanks to the contract the complementarity of
the integrating partners with third players decreases, then integration is protable. The idea
is that in this case at time 1 third players can enjoy a weaker holdup ability towards partners,
which is the reason why partners have more leverage in bargaining. But then the partners
at time 0 can strategically choose which kind of asset to integrate in order to increase the
gains from integration.
We use a cooperative-game approach, which yields very general implications about the
e¤ects of integrations on bargaining. First, we consider complete integration contracts (e.g.
Merger and Acquisition (M&A)). This is the class of contracts introduced by Segal (2003),
but we restate his results in order to have testable predictions. Then we consider two di¤erent
partial integration contracts. The rst one is the Minority Stake (MS) purchase, by which a
rm gets the control over a maximum of 50% of another companys assets. For this contract
we introduce a measure of the decisional inuence that a minority stakeholder can exert on
vendor. When only a minority stake is acquired, the acquiror may still exert some inuence
and a¤ect prots. These prots depend on the kind of assets that are acquired. We study
how the advantages of being minority stakeholders are a¤ected by the integrated assets
(complementary or substitutable) and who controls them. The second partial integration
contract is the Joint Venture (JV), where for simplicity we assume that two rms confer an
equal share of their assets to a common activity with fthy-fthy control.
Our theoretical results are the following. First, an M&A that gives partner i the full
control over partner js resources is always protable if it makes competitors less comple-
mentary (hence, less indispensable) to partner i. In this case the integrating partiesability
to holdup third parties is relatively strong.
Second, Minority Stake (MS) purchase is more protable than an M&A if partner i can
acquire the resources of partner j that make third parties more indispensable to i than to j.
Third, when partners form a JV and they exert a joint control over common resources,
the prots increase if third parties are less complementary to the JVs resources, rather than
to partnersresources separately.
The above theoretical predictions yield some testable protability conditions. Data show
that when these conditions are satised, prots increase. Specically, the return on assets
increases on average by 1:44 percentage points if rms engage in an M&A, they increase
by 1:60 percentage points in case of a Minority Stake integration, and by 0:77 in case rms
form a Joint Venture. Considering all contracts together, the return on assets increases on
average by 1:16 percentage points in the rst year and by 1:40 points in the second year.
This boost e¤ect on prots decreases in the third year and then disappears.
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Segal (2003) studies integrations theoretically. But he assumes that the partners can
only integrate 100% of their assets. We remove this assumption, study the role of minority
stakes, and test our theoretical predictions. Allowing partners to integrate less than 100%
of their assets has some important implications and it is consistent with recent develop-
ments in the literature about the incentives and the power of minority stakeholders. For
instance, minority shareholders can inuence the election of some board members even if the
majority opposes their election. They may cumulate their votes in order to elect a certain
number of directors (Bhagat and Brickley, 1984). Not only. Butz (1994) shows that minority
shareholders have inuence on the chief executive o¢ cer (CEO) because they use threats to
take majority control by purchasing more shares. Indeed, the power of minorities can be
expressed by selling and buying shares (see also Admati and Peiderer, 2009 and Edmans,
2009). Moreover, often the minorities vote on key managerial decisions such as mergers and
acquisitions (Bethel et al., 2009). As a consequence, investors may acquire voting rights
just to inuence the outcome of M&A proposals (Hu and Black, 2007), because their pref-
erences in voting give them some power, and the ability in a¤ecting board composition is
proportional to the minorities protection rights ensured by the legal environment (Kim et
al., 2007). Hubbard and Palia (1995) show that the acquisition of minority stakes increases
the acquirors prots as soon as the managerial ownership is su¢ ciently high, otherwise the
agency costs of equity would reduce the acquirors private benets of control. In other con-
texts, such as the JV formation, the minoritiesholdup ability may be a¤ected also by the
nature of the assets and the choice of sharing a joint product or just informations (Ciccotello
and Hornyak, 2000).
As for our empirical test, the main issue is measuring asset complementarity. The empir-
ical problem arises because rms are usually involved in di¤erent businesses, each of them
belonging to a specic sectoral activity. Not only. The complementarity relationships be-
tween each pair of industrial sectors may change over time because of the entry of new
products and/or technologies, and this makes complementarity a dynamic factor. To solve
this problem, we develop a novel complementarity index for multiproduct rms which is also
time varying. Using this index, we nd empirical evidence of our theoretical predictions.
Further, we show that the asset complementarities between partners and competitors has
a much stronger impact on prots than complementarity among the partners themselves. For
instance, any increase in the complementarity index between partners yields on average an
increase in prots of 27% of that change, whereas this impact grows to 94% in the case of
complementarity index between partner i and competitors. Looking at the contracts indi-
vidually, the largest gap between the e¤ects of the two complementarity indices occurs in the
case of MS purchases: 20:6% from partnerscomplementarity versus 119% from complemen-
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tarity between partner i and competitors. This nding conrms the main idea of our model
that gains from integration are not only due to an improvement in the production function
of the integrating partners, but also, and most importantly, they are due to an increase in
their power within the marketplace.
The paper is organized in four Sections. Section 2 describes the bargaining model for
integrations and provides few specic protability conditions. In Section 3 we introduce the
complementarity index for sectoral activities. This measure of asset relationships is crucial
for Section 4, where we test our ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
A set of playersN = f1; : : : ; ng own divisible assetsA = fa1; :::; ang with control structure
A(S) : 2N ! RjSj, where A(S) is the subset of A controlled by a given coalition S. For any
T  S it is true that A(T )  A(S). Contracts have the e¤ect of changing the control
structure over assets. Note that with this specication assets are divisible and each player
may transfer the control also over a part of his assets. At period 0 two players, i and j, sign
an integration contract, then at period 1 all players play a TU cooperative game and split
total payo¤s according to the probabilistic value dened below.
Let (N; v) be a game with characteristic function v(S;A(S)) : N 
 RjSj ! R, for any
coalition S  N . Let pi be a probability measure over 2Nni, e.g. a probability distribution
over the nite collection of coalitions not containing i.
Denition 1. (Weber, 1988) A solution ' = f'1; ::; 'ng is a probabilistic value if for all i
and any collection of v,
i(v) =
X
S22Nni
pi(S)iv(S;A(S)) (1)
with iv(S;A(S)) = [v(S [ i; A(S [ i))  v(S;A(S))].
The idea is that each player enters the negotiation arena at random with the scope of
forming a coalition. A probabilistic value gives each player his expected marginal contribu-
tion to the random coalition S 2 2Nni, according to pi(S) = Pr [S].
We assume that pi(S [ i) = pj(S [ j) for any S  N n i n j. This amounts to saying that
i and j behave symmetrically during negotiations. To save notation, let v(S;A(S)) = v(S).
Using a second order di¤erence operator 2kiv(S) = kv(S [ i) kv(S) (Ichiishi, 1993), we
can dene a measure of complementarity that we will use below.
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Denition 2. i) Let 2kGv(S) = kv(S [G) kv(S), with G;S  N n k and S \G = ;.
The complementarity degree between any player k 2 N , and any subset of players, G is
2kGv(S).
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Finally,
Denition 3. C() is an integration contract between i and j if
AC() = fa1; ::; ai + aj; ::; (1  )aj; ::; ang
and vC()(S) = v(S;AC()(S)).
An integration contract changes the control structure over resources, giving i the full
control of a share  2 (0; 1] of js assets aj. As in Segal (2003), the integration is advantageous
to the partners if it reduces all competitorsexpected payo¤:
k
 
vC()
  k(v) < 0 (2)
for any k 6= i; j.
2.1. M&A contracts
An M&A contract occurs when a rm i gets the majority of js shares. Then the full
control over all js resources goes to i, e.g.  = 1. Thus an M&A contract is dened as
vM&A(S) = vC(1)(S). Now player i can manage js resources even in his absence. Player j
becomes a dummy and the externality on a third player k participating coalition S is
2kjv(S [ i) 2kjv(S) (3)
The M&A is protable if it causes a negative externality on all third players; e.g. if (3) is
negative for all k and any S. A general protability condition for these collusive contracts
is provided by Segal (2003, p. 450), but Proposition 1 below restates the Segals result as
function of pre- and post- integration playerscomplementarities in order to get an empirically
testable statement.
Proposition 1. An M&A contract between i and j is protable if it reduces their comple-
mentarity with third parties.
1In more detail, a player k is complementary (substitutable) to players in G if 2kGv(S) > 0 (
2
kGv(S) <
0).
5
Proof. Assume that (3) is negative and rewrite it as
kv(S [ fi; jg) kv(S [ j)  [kv(S [ i) kv(S)] < 0
where fi; jg replaces (i [ j) and denotes the merged entity after integration. Adding the
zero-sum term kv(S) kv(S) and rearranging, yields
2kfi;jgv(S) <

2kiv(S) + 
2
kjv(S)

(4)
which must be true for any k 6= i; j and all S  N n i n j n k.
The general idea is that an M&A has two contrasting e¤ects: rst, it increases player is
holdup power on k because js contribution is delayeduntil i joins the coalition S; second,
it increases the third playersability to holdup i, since js contribution is put forward in those
coalitions that i is already in. Proposition 1 claims that the rst positive e¤ect prevails if the
contract makes third parties less complementary (hence, less indispensable) to the partners.
2.2. Minority stakes
By a Minority Stake (MS) purchase a rm i gets a share 0 <   0:5 of js assets. We
assume that i can exert a certain inuence on js decisions even if i is a minority stakeholder.2
In some cases this inuence may be so strong to give i full decisional power over js assets,
as in M&A contracts. Let  parametrize is inuence on j. Specically,  is the probability
that i acquires the full control over js resources. Conversely, (1  ) is the probability that
i only controls the minority share  of j. Formally, because of the contract any coalition
S [ i n j yields vC(1)(S) with probability , and it yields vC()(S) with probability (1  ).
As pointed out in the Introduction, the idea that minorities may exert some degree of
inuence in boards is common in the literature on corporate governance. This inuence is
strongly related to the purchased stake , but it depends also on other factors, such as the
acquirors threatening ability, the level of his managerial ownership or how much the control
over share (1  ) is unanimous (cf. Butz, 1994 and Hubbard and Palia, 1995).
Thus for any share  of acquired resources, the parameter  measures the acquirors
decisional power. Below, Proposition 2 says that if some complementarity conditions are
satised, then both M&A and MS may be advantageous at the same time, whereas Propo-
sition 3 shows in which case the MS guarantees higher prots than M&A.
Proposition 2. If an M&A contract is protable and if the presence of i reduces the third
partiescomplementarity with aj, then for any  an MS contract is protable too.
2Although i does not fully control js resources, he can always use the fraction  of js assets to exert a
threatening power against him (e.g. i could sell assets aj to some js opponent).
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Proof. By MS, the ks expected contributions become(
kv
MS(S) = kv(S [ i [ j) + (1  )kv(S [ i [ j) with S [ i
kv
MS(S) = kv(S) + (1  )kv(S [ j1 ) with S [ j
for any S  N n i n j n k, where S [ i [ j is a coalition S in which i brings also aj, and
S [ i [ j1  is a coalition S in which j brings only the share (1  )aj of his own resources.
The expected variation in ks payo¤ is
 [kv(S [ i [ j) kv(S [ i)] + (1  )

kv(S [ i [ j) kv(S [ i)

+  [kv(S n j) kv(S [ j)] + (1  )

kv(S [ j1 ) kv(S [ j)

= 

2kjv(S [ i) 2kjv(S)

+ (1  ) 2kjv(S [ i) 2kjv(S [ j1 )
Replacing the di¤erence 2kjv(S [ i) 2kjv(S) with the terms in (4) and requiring (2), we
get:
2kjv(S [ i) 2kjv(S [ j1 ) <

   1

2kfi;jgv(S) 2kiv(S) 2kjv(S)

(5)
for all S  N n i n j n k and any k 2 N n i n j. Let us denote the LHS of (5) by y and the
di¤erence in square brackets of RHS by x. The MS contract is protable if
y <

   1x (6)
Since x < 0 and 
 1 < 0 by hypothesis, a su¢ cient condition for (6) is y  0, that is
2kjv(S [ i)  2kjv(S [ j1 ) (7)
Broadly speaking, Proposition 2 states that if an M&A is protable, this does not imply
that playing a minority role through an MS contract would be unprotable. Interestingly,
Proposition 3 below shows that the gains from an MS integration might be even larger.
Proposition 3. An MS contract is preferred to an M&A if it makes third parties more
complementary with i rather than j.
Proof. Consider x; y in (6) and let x < 0 (protable M&A) and y < 0 (protable MS). An
MS contract is more protable if the externality that it produces on any k is larger than the
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externality produced by M&A, which yields
(1  )y +   x < x =) y < x (8)
The (8) implies
2kjv(S [ i) 2kjv(S [ j1 ) > 2kfi;jgv(S) 2kiv(S) 2kjv(S)
or equivalently
kv(S [ i [ j) kv(S [ i) + kv(S [ j1 ) kv(S [ j)
> kv(S [ fi; jg) kv(S) kv(S [ i) + kv(S) + kv(S) kv(S [ j)
and nally
2
kfi;jgv(S) > 
2
kfi;jgv(S [ j
1 ) (9)
for all k 2 N n i n j and S  N n i n j n k.
The main intuition behind Proposition 3 is that any acquiror i can strategically choose
that part of js assets making him more indispensable to third parties, in order to increase
his holdup power in bargaining.
Corollary 1. Suppose that an M&A is unprotable. With   0:5, the MS contract is
always protable if condition (9) holds.
Proof. By (6) the MS integration is protable if y < 0 and jyj >   x. If   0:5 the (6)
immediately implies jyj > x, or equivalently the (9).
According to Corollary 1, a player i who does not nd convenient a complete integration
with j can still advantageously buy a minority share aj even if his decisional inuence on j
is low. For instance, a partial integration with j may still be protable if the acquired assets
aj are strongly complementary to those of third parties ks.
2.3. JVs with joint ownership
When two rms form a JV they give rise to a new player which enters the market. We
model this new player as one which is able to inuence competition as much as the other
players and, of course, according to the amount of asset it is devoted to. Therefore the new
control structure is
AJV () = fa1; ::; ai(1  ); ::; (1  )aj; ::; an; (ai + aj)g
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The JV is a ctitious new player endowed with (ai + aj). We assume that the control of
the JV is assigned to i or j with equal probability. This reects the idea that each player
participates in the JV at 50%.
Proposition 4. Suppose that players i and j form a JV with common assets (ai + aj).
This contract is protable if it reduces the complementarity of third parties with the JV assets.
Proof. By the JV contract, the ks expected contributions are(
kv
JV (S) =

kv(S [ i [ j) + kv(S [ i1 )

=2 with S [ i
kv
JV (S) =

kv(S [ j [ i) + kv(S [ j1 )

=2 with S [ j
where player j1  is endowed with (1   )aj and player j is endowed with aj (similarly
for player i). The JV is protable if
kv(S [ i1  [

i; j
	
) + kv(S [ j1  [

i; j
	
)
+kv(S [ i1 ) + kv(S [ j1 )  2kv(S [ i)  2kv(S [ j) < 0
(10)
Adding the zero-sum terms
 kv(S [ i1 ) + kv(S [ i1 ) kv(S [ j1 ) + kv(S [ j1 )
the (10) implies
2kiv(S [ i1 ) + 2kjv(S [ j1 ) > 2kfi;jgv(S [ i
1 ) + 2
kfi;jgv(S [ j
1 ) (11)
for all k 2 N n i n j and S  N n i n j n k.
The LHS and RHS of (11) represent the ks complementarity with the JVs assets ai and
aj before and after integration respectively. If the contract reduces this complementarity
degree, then the partnersprots increase.
3. Complementarity index
Measuring how industries, rms, or segments within rms are related is often a quite
di¢ cult task. Existing measures use industry codes, which give qualitative measures of the
asset relationships. These measures are based on the number and the sectoral classication
of rms assets (the most di¤used is the 4-digit SIC classication) and they are often used to
nd a signicant correlation with the merging opportunity (Gort, 1962; Berry, 1974; Hassid,
1975 and Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). More sophisticated diversication measures, based on
industry codes, are the concentric index (Caves et al., 1980 and Wernerfelt and Montgomery,
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1988) and the entropy measure (Berry, 1974; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979 and Palepu, 1985),
that have been used in many empirical works on diversication (e.g. Morck et al., 1990 and
Berger and Ofek, 1995).
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that these measures are unsatisfactory in various
aspects. First, they are not able to reveal the true type of relatedness among the rms
activities. Two businesses are classied as unrelated whenever they do not share the same
two-, three-, or four-digit code, but this is not e¤ective. Some industrial sectors might
be classied as unrelated according to their three-digit NAICS code, but in fact they are
vertically related. This is the case, for example, of the oils-rening business (NAICS six-digit
code: 311225) and the petrochemical business (NAICS six-digit code: 325110).
Second, they are discrete measures and therefore do not allow for any quantitative ranking
of relatedness. We might be interested in evaluating the impact of market relatedness on
the performance of two RJVs where partners are horizontally related. In such case we would
not be able to distinguish which couple of parents are more related, thus no correlation with
the performance could be established. Third, they are not exempt from classication errors.
For these reasons some authors have recently looked for quantitative measures of diversity
based on the Input-Output (I-O) tables. One of the rst applications is given by Lemelin
(1982), whose approach is followed about twenty years later by Fan and Lang (2000) to
explore the e¤ect of asset relationships on the rmsperformance. These authors dene the
complementarity between two sectors l;m as a simple average of the degrees to which the
two industries share their inputs and output. Based on I-O Tables, for each pair of sectors l
and m the coe¢ cients rbl (for all b 6= l) and rbm (for all b 6= m) dene the values of bs output
required to produce 1$ output in industries l and m, respectively, while the coe¢ cients cbl
and cbm are the percentages of ls andms output used by any intermediate industry b, except
l, m. Finally, the Fan and Langs (2000) complementarity index between two single-product
rms producing l and m is
COMP (l;m) =
corr(rbl; rbm) + corr(cbl; cbm)
2
(12)
As pointed out in the Introduction, we identify two main problems related to index (12).
First, rms are usually involved in many di¤erent sectoral activities, each of them showing a
specic complementarity degree with the industrial sectors of any random partner. Second,
the complementarity among rms may change over time according to their business strategies
(e.g. the launch of new products, or the adoption of new technologies).
Starting from the general idea of Fan and Lang (2000), we propose a new index that allows
to examine complementarity among multiproduct rms. Moreover, this index is based on
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I-O tables which are updated yearly, and therefore it is time varying.
Consider two rms, i and j, involved in a number of sectors l = 1; :::; L and m = 1; :::;M
respectively. Vectors fi1; :::; iLg and fj1; :::; jMg dene the set of i and js business lines il
and jm. Using (12), we measure the complementarity index between multiproduct rms i
and j by
COMPi;j =
LX
l=1
MX
m=1
(sil  sjm)COMP (il; jm) (13)
where weights si = (si1 ; :::; siL) and sj = (sj1 ; :::; sjM ) are the shares of the market operating
revenue turnover that i and j draw from their sectoral businesses.
We also dene the i and js complementarity in the presence of a group S of competitors.
In this case, (13) is averaged with the mean complementarity degree between any k 2 S and
i or j considered individually:
COMP Si;j = (Ri +Rj)COMPi;j +
X
k2S
Rk [(COMPi;k + COMPj;k) =2] (14)
Weights Ri, Rj, Rk are the rmsshares of total operating revenue turnover. All indices
above belong to the interval [ 1; 1]. Applying (13) and (14) period by period, we explore
how rmsbusiness lines change over time and how this changes a¤ect their complementarity
relationships.
4. Empirical evidence
4.1. Asset complementarities and integration protability
We apply two di¤erent empirical strategies on a sample of 8866 US rms that signed a
bilateral contract of M&A (439 units), MS (6922) or JV (1505) in period 2002-2007. First,
we run regressions to test theoretical protability conditions, (4), (7) or (11). Since contracts
have important implications both on the size and other rms characteristics (e.g. e¢ ciency,
productivity,...) we use a dynamic model that takes into account the autocorrelation in the
variable that measures performance.
Because of dynamic e¤ects and endogeneity problem, we adopt a dynamic GMMproposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998), where variables are instrumented by using their lagged and
non-lagged rst-di¤erences. The basic model is
ROAit = ROAit 1 + 1SIZEit + 2Ti + 3Ti  PCit + 4TCit + i + yt + it (15)
where the treatment dummy variable Ti captures the existence of an integration contract for
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rm i and the dependent variable ROAit (return on assets) measures his nancial perfor-
mance in every year t.
The row vector SIZEit incudes variables SALESit (net sales, in natural log), EMPLit
(number of employees, in natural log) and their rst order lags. We model SALES and
EMPL as endogenous variables and instrument themwith their lagged levels. The remaining
variables are predetermined, as unforecastable errors in a period might a¤ect future changes
in other covariates, and this prevents strict exogeneity.
We test the theoretical protability conditions by the interaction terms TiPCit, where
PCit is a dummy indicating whether the protability condition associated with contract Ti
is satised or not.
Vector TCit in (15) is composed of interactions of Ti with the following four complemen-
tarity indices. The rst two indices are Cikit and Cjkit, and they measure the complemen-
tarity degree between each single partner (i or j) and all competitors ks. The third index,
Cijit, gives the complementarity between each pair of partners. The fourth index, Cijkit,
represents the average level of complementarity within the market. We compute them fol-
lowing the procedure described in Section 3. By construction, they are time varying. Finally,
 and y in (15) represent the rm and time specic e¤ects, and  the usual disturbance term.
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 1 show the results for M&A, MS and JV contracts, respectively.
There is evidence that when protability conditions (4), (7) or (11) hold then post-integration
prots are higher. The variable of interest is T  PC, the interaction between the two
dummies for treatment and for protability conditions. Coe¢ cients associated with this
variable show that in case of MS purchases the protability condition has the strongest
impact on prots (the value is 1:595, and it is signicant at 1%). This means that, for
instance, provided condition (7) is satised, an MS purchase increases the acquirors returns
by 1:595 percentage points on average. The lowest impact of protability conditions occurs
in the case of a JV, but still prots increase by 0:77 percentage points (and signicant at
1%). These results conrm our theoretical prediction that contracts increase prots because
they a¤ect the technological relationships among rms, and ultimately their power in the
marketplace.
The e¤ect of partnerscomplementarity on the post-agreement performance is measured
by interaction T Cij. For any increase in Cij, the impact on prots is 11% of this change
if the contract is an M&A, almost 27% in case of MS and 49% in case of JV.
We compare this impact of partnerscomplementarity with the impact of complemen-
tarity between a contracting rm and its competitors, as measured by the interaction of
treatment variable T with complementarity index Cik. Coe¢ cients for T  Cik span from
1:058 (in case of an M&A) to 1:378 (in case of a JV), at a level of signicance 1%, and they
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point out that for any contract the inuence exerted on prots is much stronger than that of
complementarity between partners. Instead, looking at the average impact across the three
contracts, for any increase in the complementarity index between partners the impact on
prots is 27% of that change, whereas it is 94% in the case of complementarity between
partner i and competitors.
This stronger impact of complementarity between integrating partner and competitors
reects the central idea in our theoretical model that gains from integration are mainly due
to the fact that integration increases integrating partnerspower towards competitors and
trading parties. The e¤ects of integration on the production function (e.g. better synergies,
organization, etc.) are positive, relevant, but quantitatively less important.
Additional support to this idea comes from other two interactions, T Cjk and T Cijk
(cf. Table 1). The former measures the impact of complementarity between target j and
competitors, which turns out not to have the same sign for all contracts. There is a positive
e¤ect on performance in the case of JV (the coe¢ cient takes value 0:591), but a negative
e¤ect in case of M&A ( 0:301) and MS ( 1:426). Notice that all coe¢ cients are signicant
at 1%.
The second interaction, T  Cijk, refers to the e¤ect of complementarity amongst all
rms in our sample, which is measured by Cijk. When the value of this index is high, third
parties have a higher chance to nd good trading alternatives to the integrated rm. For all
contracts, Table 1 shows that the higher the complementarity amongst all rms the lower
the performance from integration. This result is consistent with the idea that integration
contracts are less protable if competitors can easily nd good alternative trading parties,
with respect to i and j.
Finally, in order to check the model specication, we test the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation in the rst-di¤erenced errors, at order two. The hypothesis is not rejected (see
AR(2) test in Table 1), thus the moment conditions used here are valid. Notice also that,
for all regressions, the Sargan test does not reject the overidentication restrictions (see last
row of Table 1).
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Table 1: Complementarity and post-integration performance.
Dynamic GMM (Blundell-Bond, 1998) estimators.
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. ROA M&A MS JV
ROA(t  1) 0:180 0:172 0:188
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
SALES 0:132 0:010 0:023
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
SALES(t  1) 0:079  0:007  0:145
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
EMPL 0:008  0:003 0:009
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
EMPL(t  1)  0:004 0:001 0:006
(0:000) (0:000) (0:009)
T 1:191 1:867 1:520
(0:018) (0:000) (0:000)
T  PC 1:440 1:595 0:771
(0:078) (0:000) (0:000)
T  Cij 0:111 0:206 0:490
(0:041) (0:061) (0:000)
T  Cik 1:058 1:194 1:378
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
T  Cjk  0:301  1:426 0:591
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
T  Cijk  0:443  1:444  0:591
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
AR(1) test (p-value) 0:000 0:000 0:000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0:167 0:206 0:132
Sargan (p-value) 0:101 0:120 0:257
Notes: p-values in parentheses; *** p <0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
All regressions include time xed e¤ects.
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4.2. Average e¤ect of protability conditions
In order to provide further supporting evidence to our predictions, we estimate the aver-
age impact of protability conditions on post-integration performance. We apply the ATT
(Average Treatment e¤ect on Treated) technique to the group of integrated rms. In order
to have a su¢ ciently large sample, we do not di¤erentiate by the type of integration (e.g.
M&A, MS and JV are considered the same). Within the group, we distinguish between
treated and control rms. A rm is dened treated if satises the corresponding prof-
itability requirement in all the four post-integration years. Therefore the treatment group
includes all companies such that both dummy variables T and PC take value 1 starting from
the year of integration.
The second group is the counterfactual group of controls. This group includes companies
which do not satisfy our protability condition in the four post-integration years: for these
companies the treatment variable T takes value 1 but dummy variable PC takes value 0.
Controls and treated are grouped according to their similarity based on a propensity
score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This score is computed by a probit on a vector X of
pre-treatment characteristics. In vector X we include former variables EMPL and SALES,
as proxies for dimensionality, and the new variables RSF (return on shareholders funds) and
EV (enterprise value), as proxies for protability. Then we compute the average e¤ect of
treatment based on the nearest neighbor matching.
Table 2 shows the results. On average, the impact of our protability conditions on rate
of return is a signicant increase of 1:16 percentage points in the rst year, and 1:40 in the
second year. This boost e¤ect decreases in the third year and then disappears.
These ndings provide additional support to our model.
Table 2: Average Treatment E¤ect (ATT) from contract protability conditions.
Post-estimation window: 2003-2009.
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
ATT 1:159 1:402 0:499  1:221
Treated (T = 1; PC = 1) 1116 1120 1176 1072
Controls (T = 1; PC = 0) 1193 1126 1078 920
Notes: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate three forms of integration contracts, which have the e¤ect of
changing the control over partnersresources. Our theoretical model accounts not only for
the improvement in the joint production function of the integrating partners, but also for
the increase in their power within the marketplace.
Our reference model is the work of Segal (2003), who studies integration contracts when
players integrate 100 per cent of their resources. We consider contracts in which two players
may integrate less than 100 per cent of their assets, and possibly exert minority control.
The model shows that being a minority stakeholder can increase prots compared to full
control, for instance when the purchased minority assets are highly complementary to third
parties. The reason is that this kind of integration yields a major increase in the power to
holdup trading parties. A JV is highly protable if it allows the partners to prot from their
complementarities and, at the same time, if it makes third parties less indispensable.
We provide empirical evidence of our results using a sample of US quoted companies. To
measure rmsasset complementarities we develop a measure based on the I-O coe¢ cients.
Our measure is time varying and most importantly it applies to multiproduct rms.
Data show that prots increase by a substantial amount when the theoretical protability
conditions are satised. This supports the main idea of our theoretical approach, based
on cooperative games: prots from integration are not only due to e¢ ciency gains at the
production stage, but also to higher bargaining power in the marketplace.
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